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Abstract
Social media can be viewed as a social system where the cur-
rency is attention. People post content and interact with oth-
ers to attract attention and gain new followers. In this paper,
we examine the distribution of attention across a large sam-
ple of users of a popular social media site Twitter. Through
empirical analysis of these data we conclude that attention is
very unequally distributed: the top 20% of Twitter users own
more than 96% of all followers, 93% of the retweets, and 93%
of the mentions. We investigate the mechanisms that lead to
attention inequality and find that it results from the “rich-
get-richer” and “poor-get-poorer” dynamics of attention dif-
fusion. Namely, users who are “rich” in attention, because
they are often mentioned and retweeted, are more likely to
gain new followers, while those who are “poor” in attention
are likely to lose followers. We develop a phenomenological
model that quantifies attention diffusion and network dynam-
ics, and solve it to study how attention inequality grows over
time in a dynamic environment of social media.
Introduction
Inequality is a pervasive social phenomenon. For example,
income and wealth are not evenly distributed in modern so-
ciety, but instead, concentrated among few individuals. The
richest 20% in the United States own more than 80% of
the country’s total wealth, while the poorest 20% own just
a fraction of one percent (Norton and Ariely 2011). Inequal-
ity does not just violate our sense of fairness (Norton and
Ariely 2011), but it also reduces economic opportunities,
and has been linked to negative social outcomes, such as
poor health (Kawachi and Kennedy 1999) and high crime
rates (Kelly 2000) in societies with high levels of inequality.
While economic inequality has been widely discussed re-
cently, inequalities are rampant in other domains, including
science and entertainment, where a few individuals receive
disproportionate share of attention and the benefits it brings.
In science, specifically, attention can be measured by the
number of citations that papers (and scientists who publish
them) receive. The distribution of the number of citations is
extremely unequal, with some papers receiving thousands of
citations, while many others are seldom cited (Allison 1980;
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Klamer and Van Dalen 2002). Researchers have long spec-
ulated about the origins of inequalities. Current consen-
sus holds that inequality cannot be explained by variation
in quality of the work or individual talent (Adler 1985;
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts 2006; Lariviere and Gingras
2010). Rather, it is the result of the underlying social pro-
cesses, such as the “cumulative advantage” or the “rich-get-
richer” effect, which brings greater recognition to those who
are already distinguished (Merton 1968; Allison, Long, and
Kraze 1982).
In online social media attention is also non-uniformly dis-
tributed. Some user-generated photos and videos are viewed,
liked, or shared orders of magnitude more times than the
rest. Psy’s Gangnam Style video, for example, was viewed
over 2 billion times on YouTube, while the average video
has fewer than 100 thousand views. Attention paid to people
is also highly unequal. A few Twitter users have tens of mil-
lions of followers, while the majority have just a handful of
followers. These popular users enjoy an unparalleled advan-
tage: things they say on Twitter, from product endorsements
to personal opinions, are seen by millions, making them po-
tentially far more influential than ordinary users.
In this paper, we carry out quantitative analysis of data
from the microblogging service Twitter to characterize and
quantify attention inequality in social media. We identify a
set of almost 6,000 users and monitor their activity over a
period of several months. We show that attention is very un-
equally distributed: the top 20% of Twitter users in our sam-
ple own 97% of all followers, 93% of retweets, and 93%
of mentions. By observing how the monitored users allo-
cate their attention over time, via following, mentioning or
retweeting other users, we are able to study the processes
leading to attention inequality. We empirically demonstrate
that the attention Twitter users receive by being mentioned
or having their posts retweeted by others results in them
gaining new followers. In contrast, users with fewer follow-
ers are retweeted less frequently and are more likely to lose
followers. We construct a phenomenological model of atten-
tion diffusion where these two processes — mentioning and
retweeting — result in changes in the structure of the un-
derlying follower network. After parameterizing the model,
we solve it to study how attention and inequality evolve over
time. Our model produces a “rich-get-richer” and “poor-get-
poorer” dynamic, whereby users with more followers, i.e.,
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Twitter celebrities, are mentioned and retweeted more fre-
quently, which results in them gaining even more followers.
Our model is able to identify users who will gain more at-
tention, to predict the evolution of the follower network and
attention inequality.
There are consequences to high attention inequality, few
of which have been explored in the context of social me-
dia. High inequality focuses the attention of the online com-
munity on relatively few users, allowing them to dispropor-
tionately benefit from the attention they receive. Compa-
nies compensate social media celebrities for endorsing their
products and messages. Ordinary users receive no such pay-
offs. Attention is the currency of social media and, similar
to other currencies, it is finite. When everyone is retweeting
a popular celebrity or watching a viral video, it means that
other people are not being retweeted, and other videos are
not being watched. Thus, inequality diminishes the diversity
of content and view points to which people are exposed. But
inequality may also have hidden benefits. When every single
person had watched the same video, or read the same story,
it gives people a common topic for conversation (and tweet-
ing) and a common vocabulary with which to discuss. Thus,
inequality reinforces social identity.
Our work raises a number of questions, including why do
users tolerate extreme attention inequality? How does it af-
fect user behavior? Does it reduce their engagement with
Twitter, or does it inspire them to be more active in gain-
ing attention? And not least, should Twitter, and other social
media sites, do something to ensure attention is more equi-
tably distributed? We hope that our work stimulates research
community to address these questions.
Quantifying Attention Inequality
In this section we quantitatively characterize the attention
received by users and content they post on Twitter. Although
we focus on Twitter, our definitions of attention generalize
to other social media platforms.
Data Description
We collected data from Twitter over a period from March
2014 to Oct 2014 using the following strategies. First, we
randomly selected 5600 seed users whose user ids range
from [0,760000000]. We then used the Twitter API to peri-
odically query the friends of seed users (i.e., whom the seed
users were following), which resulted in a dynamic network
where each edge had a time stamp with its creation and/or
deletion date. Next, we collected profile information for all
the seed users and their friends, as well as timeline tweets.
The number of tweets gives that user’s activity, or engage-
ment, level. We tracked the retweet/reply/mention status of
each tweet from its raw Jason object returned by Twitter. The
number of retweets gives the number of times users have
shared a particular tweet with their own followers. As we ar-
gue later, this is an important measure of attention. For the
seed users, we further monitored their temporal profiles by
querying user profile weekly during the data collection pe-
riod.
The data collection process resulted in 23,831,568 tweets
and a dynamic network with 1,944,383 users and 17,869,415
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Figure 1: Distribution of the numbers of (a) followers, (b)
friends, (c) status updates posted, and (d) retweets received
for seed users and all users. We logarithmically bin data for
smoothing.
edges. To provide more details about statistics of our data,
we analyze the distribution of the numbers of followers,
friends, status updates (user activity), and the times that the
tweets of the seed users, and all users in our data, were
retweeted. Note that we use ‘status updates’ to refer to the
aggregate tweets posted by user since account creation, and
we use ‘tweets’ to refer to the tweets user posted during
a specific time period. These distributions, plotted in Fig-
ure 1, have a characteristic long-tailed form, where a few
users have extremely large numbers of friends, followers or
posted tweets, while many users have few friends, followers
or posted tweets. Such distributions are generally associated
with high inequality.
Except for activity (number of posted tweets) and number
of retweets, the distributions for seed and all users are very
similar, which indicates success of our random seed user se-
lection strategy. The small differences between the distribu-
tion of number of tweets among seed users and among all
users arise because the profile information of seed users is
obtained from raw Jason objects of tweets, and thus users
who never post any tweets cannot be selected as seed users
in our data collection. Due to these differences, the distribu-
tion of number of retweets among seed users, also slightly
differs from that among all users.
Attention Inequality
How much attention do Twitter users receive? Certainly, it
makes sense to use the number of followers as a measure
of attention: the more followers you have, the more peo-
ple will see the messages you post. However, there is also
a wide distribution in user activity, and a person with a mil-
lion followers who never posts anything will not receive any
attention. Therefore, we propose two additional measures of
0 20 40 60 80 1000
20
40
60
80
100
Sorted population (%)
At
te
nt
io
n 
(%
)
Numberfollowers (Gini=0.9412)
Number
mentions (Gini=0.9133)
Number
retweets (Gini=0.9034)
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 1000
20
40
60
80
100
Sorted population (%)
Ac
tiv
ity
 (%
)
 
Numberfriends (Gini=0.6831)
Number
status (Gini=0.5939)
(b)
Figure 2: Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of inequalities
of (a) attentions and (b) activities among seed users.
attention — the number of times a user’s posts are retweeted,
or reshared by others, and the number of times a user is men-
tioned by others. These measures of attention are related: on
average, the number of times a user’s post is retweeted or
the number of times a user is mentioned is proportional to
the number of followers the user has. However, using the to-
tal number of retweets allows us to include variation in user
activity in a measure of received attention; while using the
total number of mentions includes effects of celebrity. Since
we have the network, profile and activity information only
for seed users, we analyze how these seeds users allocate
their attention to other users.
Inequality of a distribution can be characterized using the
Lorenz curve, which graphically represents the cumulative
distribution function of the empirical probability distribu-
tion. In other words, it plots the cumulative share of value,
e.g., number of followers, as a function of the cumulative
percentage of the population who have at least that many
followers. Perfect equality is a straight y = x, in which the
bottom x% of people have y% of the followers. However,
when inequality exists, the Lorenz curve is highly skewed.
Figure 2(a) shows the Lorenz curves for the number of fol-
lowers of seed users, the number of times they were men-
tioned, and the number of times their posts were retweeted.
It shows attention unequally distributed: the top 1% of seed
users account for approximately 50% of the total retweets,
60% of the total followers, and 66% of the total mentions.
Another way to characterize the inequality of a distribu-
tion is with the Gini coefficient (Gini 1997). Given a sample
of data x1, · · ·xi, the Gini coefficient can be calculated from
the following equation:
g =
∑
i
∑
j |xi − xj |
2N2x
(1)
Gini coefficient is zero, meaning there is perfect equality,
when all values in a sample are the same, and it attains a
value one, meaning maximum inequality, when one num-
ber in the set is nonzero and the rest are zeros. Gini co-
efficient also gives the area between the Lorenz curve of
a distribution and the line of perfect equality. Gini coeffi-
cient of the number of followers in Fig. 2(a) is g = 0.9412,
for the number of mentions it is g = 0.9133, and for the
number of retweets it is g = 0.9034. The Gini coefficient
of the much discussed income inequality is less than 0.5
for the United States, and the much larger wealth inequal-
ity has Gini coefficient of around 0.8.1 Attention inequality
on Twitter is staggering. The vast majority of users do not
receive any attention, and the top 1% of users get far more
attention than the bottom 99% combined! What then drives
user engagement and activity on Twitter? A measure of user
engagement is the number of friends they follow and the
number of tweets they post. Figure 2(b) shows the Lorenz
curves of these distributions for the seed users in our data.
Results indicate that user engagement is also unequally dis-
tributed, with Gini coefficient of g = 0.6831 for the number
of friends and g = 0.5939 for the number of tweets. Al-
though still unequal, user activity is more equally distributed
than attention.
Dynamics of Inequality
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Figure 3: Change in inequality users over time. Here
RT itemall indicates the number of re-tweets a tweet that is
posted by any seed user received from all users in one
week period; while RTuserseed /M
user
seed denotes the number of
retweets/mentions a user received from seed users in one
week period at three points in time.
Is high inequality simply an artifact of Twitter’s young
age and will correct itself over time as users distribute their
attention more equitably? Or is the inequality increasing
over time? Figure 3 shows how inequality changed over time
during data collection period. The plot shows the Gini co-
efficients of different measures of attention at three points
in time. The inequality of the number of followers, and the
number of retweets of a user (RTuserseed ) are increasing over
time; while attention to content, given by the number of
times different items are retweeted by all users (RT itemall )
fluctuates over time. The attention inequality in terms of
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
countries_by_distribution_of_wealth
number of mentions, increases over time, but the margin
is too small to be significant. The plot also shows that the
attention that items posted on Twitter receive (RT itemall ) is
somewhat more equitably distributed than the attention paid
to users.
In addition, we calculate inequality of user activity at dif-
ferent points in time, which includes the number of friends,
number of status updates, number of unfriends (i.e., number
of lost followers), and number of new friends gained at dif-
ferent time periods. The results are plotted in the lower part
of Figure 3. Note that we use number of status updates to
denote the aggregate number of tweets users made since ac-
count creation. These results indicate that activity inequality
also increases over time, which indicates that both new con-
tent and new links are created by a small set of super-active
users. Also, activity inequality, while high, is substantially
less than attention inequality.
These findings suggest that there are processes that drive
attention to be concentrated on few individuals at the ex-
clusion of others, even though user engagement is far more
equally distributed. In the next section we examine these
questions to construct a model of the dynamics of attention.
Attention Diffusion Model
To help explain dynamics of attention inequality in online
social media, we develop a model of network dynamics via
diffusion of attention. This model captures the evolution of
the Twitter follower network as users are brought to the at-
tention of potential new followers. As these subsequently
link to the original users, the Twitter network grows, bring-
ing even more attention to the original users.
One of the best-known models of network evolution is
the BA model (Barabasi and Albert 1999) with preferen-
tial attachment mechanism. In this model, a new node links
to an existing node with probability proportional to its de-
gree. This makes it more likely for high degree nodes to ac-
quire new links, resulting in a “rich get richer” phenomenon.
This is a plausible model for the growth of the Twitter fol-
lower network: users who already have many followers are
more likely to get attention and attract even more followers.
However, Twitter platform is highly complex and dynamic:
users post messages, which may then be retweeted by oth-
ers. These retweets create opportunities for new follow links
to be formed (Weng et al. 2013). Users are also mentioned
by others, which also creates opportunities for new follow
links (Zhu and Lerman 2014). However, links are often bro-
ken as users unfollow others (Myers and Leskovec 2014).
Below we empirically characterize how these factors con-
tribute to the growth — and the loss — of attention on Twit-
ter.
Twitter users are heterogeneous, and popular users who
are “wealthy” in attention could behave in a qualitatively
different manner from the less popular users. To partially
control for heterogeneity, we split users into classes accord-
ing to the number of followers they have. For simplicity, we
use five classes, corresponding to quintiles in the number of
followers. Table 1 reports statistics of the top three quintiles.
Users in the first quintile, representing the 20% of the users
with most followers, have over 29K followers on average
Table 1: Statistics of classes when users are divided into
quintiles based on the number of followers they have. The
numbers represent the average number of followers and the
average activity of users in each class.
quin-tile # statuses # followers
Q1 1
st 14,086 29,021
Q2 2
nd 7,184 1,058
Q3 3
rd 4,053 445
and tweeted over 14K status updates on average. Users in
the second quintile, representing the next 20% of most pop-
ular users, have almost 1K followers on average and posted
almost 7K tweets, while users in the third quintile have a
little more than 400 followers and posted almost 4K times.
Users in the bottom two quintiles did not have much activity
and were excluded from analysis. The main idea behind this
division is that users within the same quintile will be more
homogeneous and similar to each other.
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Figure 4: Relation between posting activity and attention ((a)
number of followers, (b) number of retweets). More tweets
a user posted, more followers and retweets a user received.
After creating more homogeneous populations, we exam-
ine how the attention users receive leads them to gain, or
lose, followers. Again, we quantify attention by the num-
ber of times users are mentioned and the number of times
they are retweeted by their followers. Both of these depend
on the number of followers users currently have. While this
is not directly under user’s control, they can try to increase
the number of followers by following other users, and hop-
ing that some of these will result in reciprocal links. Users
can also attempt to increase the number of times they are
retweeted by posting more tweets, although bursts of tweet-
ing activity may cause followers to classify users as spam-
mers and unfollow them. Below we examine how these fac-
tors are correlated with the attention users receive and their
probability to gain or lose followers.
Observation 1 (Effect of tweeting) Users who post more
tweets receive more attention.
We examine the relationship between posting activity,
measured by the number of status updates users tweet, and
the number of followers they have. Figure 4(a) confirm an
earlier finding (Hodas, Kooti, and Lerman 2013) that activ-
ity and number of followers are positively correlated. Post-
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Figure 5: Relation between following activity and attention
((a) number of followers, (b) number of retweets).
ing activity also affects how much attention user’s posts re-
ceive, which we measure by the number of times the posts
are retweeted. Figure 4(b) shows a clear positive correlation
between activity and number of retweets for the first three
user quintiles. Since each retweet increases user’s visibility
by bringing his name into the feeds of the retweeting user’s
followers, it also increases the likelihood of gaining new fol-
lowers (Weng et al. 2013; Zhu and Lerman 2014). We do not
show the plot that evaluates the relationship between posting
activity and mentions since that correlation is relatively low
0.0259.
Observation 2 (Effect of following) The following others
does not necessarily increase attention.
Next, we examine whether by following more people, users
can increase the attention they receive. In general, there is a
positive correlation between the number of friends users fol-
low and the number of followers they have (Figure 5(a)). The
exception to this trend are the few outliers who have fewer
friends than followers. Most of these users represent orga-
nizational accounts, such as YouTube with only 851 friends
but 47.6 million followers, or celebrities, such as Lady Gaga
with 133 thousand friends but 43.6 million followers. How-
ever, as shown in Figure 5(b), there is no strong correlation
between the number of friends and the number of retweets
user receive. Similarly, the correlation between following
activity and number of mentions is only 0.0124. Therefore,
following more people does not translate into increased at-
tention.
Observation 3 (Effect of attention) The more attention
users receive, via retweets and mentions, the more follow-
ers users will gain.
As previously observed, each retweet (Weng et al. 2013)
and mention (Zhu and Lerman 2014) by followers increases
the attention the user receives by bringing his or her name
into the feeds of other users. These others may subsequently
decide to follow the mentioned or retweeted user, increasing
the number of followers he or she has as a result. Figure 6(a)
tests this idea by plotting the mean probability of acquiring
a new follower as a function of retweet count among the
first three user quintiles. Generally, there is a strong positive
correlation between the number of retweets and probability
of getting new followers. Moreover, the correlation among
users with largest number of followers is even stronger (Fig-
ure 6(a)) .
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Figure 6: Probability of gaining new followers vs (a) the
number of retweets and (b) mentions users receive.
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Figure 7: Probability of gaining followers vs the number of
current followers users have.
Figure 6(b) shows the relationship between the number of
mentions users receive and the probability of gaining new
followers. Interestingly, mentions serve to attract new fol-
lowers mainly for the most popular users, i.e., those with
most followers.
Observation 4 (The Matthew effect) The more attention
users have, the more attention they will receive. The less at-
tention users have, the easier it is to lose attention.
The feedback between users’ popularity, measured by the
number of followers they have, and the attention they re-
ceive via retweets and mentions, leads to a “rich-get-richer”
phenomenon. Figure 7 empirically validates the positive cor-
relation between the mean probability of acquiring new fol-
lower and the number of followers users already have. Note
that we log-binned the data to improve statistics; however,
since there are few users with very large numbers of follow-
ers, there are large fluctuations in the extreme right portion
of the plot due to poor statistics. More followers will, in turn,
create more attention and even more followers. Overall, it
appears that Matthew effect (Merton 1968) also operates in
social media: “attention breeds attention.”
In addition to gaining followers, users can also lose fol-
lowers in the dynamic Twitter network (Myers and Leskovec
2014). In fact, we observed nearly as many new links created
as destroyed. Figure 8 plots number of new follow links cre-
ated and the number of follow links broken by seed users
during each time period. Both created links and broken links
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Figure 8: Total number of new links and broken links made
by seed users in half months.
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Figure 9: The current attention ((a) number of followers, (b)
number of retweets) against the mean probability of follow-
ers they lost. Here we use logarithmic bin size.
contribute significantly to the dynamics of the network. The
average of new friends followed per user in a two-week pe-
riod is around 20.87, and average of unfollowed users per
person is around 19.04. These statistics show that broken
links occur as frequent as new links in social media.
Who loses followers and why? As shown in Figure 9(a),
users with many followers (>1,000) are far less likely to be
unfollowed than users with few followers (<100). Unfollow
probability does not vary by posting activity: for the same
number of followers, users who post many status updates
are not more likely to be unfollowed than users who post
few status updates.
Figure 9(b) plots the probability of losing followers as a
function of the number of times user’s posts are retweeted.
Clearly, the more times the users are retweeted, the less
likely they are to lose followers, perhaps because others find
their tweets valuable.
We also studied whether bursts of tweeting activity result
in a loss of followers. Too many tweets appearing all at once
in followers’ feeds could be interpreted as spamming behav-
ior, resulting in followers breaking the link. We adopt a Kur-
tosis metric to evaluate the burstiness of tweeting. Specifi-
cally, the Kurtosis metric is defined as follows:
Kurt(u) =
E[(Pu − Pu)]4
(E[(Pu − Pu)2])2
where Pu is a random variable that denotes the number of
tweets posted by u at each time period, and Pu is the av-
erage number of tweets per time period. We found, how-
Table 2: Notations and explanations.
Variable Description
pi number of tweets made by user i
fi number of followers of i
ri number of retweets of i’s posts by followers
mi number mentions of i by followers
P+f probability of gaining followers
P−f probability of losing followers
ever, that tweeting burstiness does not necessarily increase
the probability of either gaining new followers or losing fol-
lowers. The correlation between burstiness and the proba-
bility of gaining new followers for the top 3 quin-tiles is
0.0797, -0.085 and 0.1596 respectively; while the correla-
tion between burstiness and the probability of losing follow-
ers for the top 3 quin-tiles is 0.0765, 0.0451, and -0.0811.
Therefore, for users who have low attention, burstiness of
tweeting might help gain new followers. In addition, for
users who have much attention, burstiness of post visibility
might cause information overload and lose followers.
Collectively these observations suggest that both prongs
of the Matthew effect operate to change the number of fol-
lowers and increase the inequality of attention: those with
most followers also acquire new followers at a faster rate,
and those with the least followers also lose them at a faster
rate. Since the number of followers is directly related to
how much attention users receive, those rich in attention get
richer, and those poor in attention get poorer. However, users
can control to some extent how much attention they receive,
at least via retweeting, by increasing their posting activity
without worrying that they will lose followers as a result.
Model Description
Attention diffusion provides a mechanism for the evolution
of the Twitter follower network. Below we introduce a dy-
namic model where the likelihood of forming a new follow
link to a user, or breaking an existing link, depends on the
amount of attention the user receives. Thus, the main vari-
ables used by the model include the number of followers
users have (fi), the number of times they tweet (pi), and the
number of times they are mentioned (mi) or their posts are
retweeted (ri). These variables are summarized in Table 2.
According to the observations of the previous section,
the average probability of gaining new followers P+f is a
function of the number of times the user is mentioned or
retweeted. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) suggest that in our dataset
this function can be approximated with
P+f ∼ w1rα + w2mβ , (2)
where w1 controls the contribution of retweets to the forma-
tion of new links, and w2 controls the contribution of men-
tions to new links.
Similarly, Figure 9 suggests that for our data, the average
probability of unfollowing P−f can be approximated with:
P−f ∼ w3r−θ. (3)
Table 3: Model parameters estimated by regression.
Parameter User quin-tile
Q1 Q2 Q3
α 0.634 1.0145 0.448
β 0.865 0.0 1.141
θ 0.129 -0.730 -0.020
w1 0.00215 0.0 0.00006
w2 0.00038 0.00030 0.0
w3 0.00836 -0.00135 -300.0
C 8546 754 -9
RMSE 52800 406 334
The equations above allow us to specify how the number
of followers of a user i changes over time. Let fi be a dy-
namic variable representing the number of followers user i
has at a given time. Then the rate at which user i gains new
followers is:
df+i
dt
= (N − fi)(w1rαi + w2mβi ) (4)
where N is the size of the user population, and N − fi de-
notes the set of available potential followers, i.e., users who
do not yet follow user i.
We rewrite the Eq.4 as
df+i
dt
= bifi − biN (5)
where bi =−w1rαi −w2mβi . By integrating Eq. 5, we obtain:
f+i (t) = Ce
bit − biNt (6)
Similarly, the rate at which user i loses followers is de-
fined as
df−i
dt
= fiw3r
−θ
i (7)
By integrating Eq. 7, we obtain:
f−i (t) = C2e
w3r
−θ
i t (8)
Combining Eq. 6 with Eq. 8 and using the factor that fi(t) =
fi(0) when t = 0, we have C2 = C. Then the dynamic
number of followers can be computed as:
fi(t) = f(0) + Ce
bit − Cew3r−θi t − biNt (9)
Parameter Estimation
The model is parameterized by constants α, β, θ, C, w1, w2,
and w3. We estimate these parameters using regression on
data between March 20 to July 20. Since different popula-
tions of users (in different quin-tiles) might be characterized
by different parameters, in the following, we separate users
by quin-tile, and estimate model parameters separately for
each population. We set the unit of time interval as four days.
The results of estimated parameters are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 indicates that different user populations attract
new followers in different ways. For example, the values of
parameters β and w2, which control how mentions generate
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Figure 10: Distribution of the predicted and actual number
of followers of seed users.
new followers, are much high for users in the first quin-tile
(Q1) than the other quin-tiles. This shows that users with
most followers, are more likely to be mentioned by oth-
ers and consequently followed. The most-followed users are
likely to be celebrities. When they are mentioned, and peo-
ple who do not yet follow them see their name, they may rec-
ognize the name and decide to follow the celebrity in turn.
For the more ordinary users in the third quin-tile Q3, men-
tions do not lead to any new followers. For them, attention
does not translate into new followers. In addition, for users
in the first quin-tile, the number of followers lost decays ex-
ponentially with the number of retweets, indicating they are
much less likely to lose followers if they post good content,
even lots of it. In contrast, for users in the second and third
quintileQ2 andQ3, the number of followers lost decays sub-
linearly with the number of retweets. In other words, they
are more likely to lose followers than first quin-tile users,
even when they post content that receives similar level of at-
tention. The attention-rich users have an advantage over the
rest of the users: they accrue new followers more easily and
don’t lose them as much as the rest of the users.
Solving the Model
By solving the model (Eq. 9) with the learned parameters
(Table 3), we can predict the number of followers each seed
user in our data has at any time after training time period.
Here we set the initial condition, that is, f(0), as the num-
ber of followers each seed user had on July 20 2014. Fig-
ure 10 compares the predicted distribution of followers of
seed users on October 14, 2014 to the actual number of fol-
lowers they have on that date (ground truth). This validates
that the proposed model can correctly replicate the distribu-
tion of attention to users.
Next, we examine how well the proposed model predicts
dynamics of follower inequality. Figure 11 compares the in-
equality of the predicted and actual number of followers at
three different points in time. The attention diffusion model
results in high follower inequality, with values of the Gini
coefficient around 0.94. In addition, in the attention diffu-
sion model, inequality grows over time as attention becomes
more concentrated on a small number of users. The trends
using the proposed attention model are close to the empiri-
cal ground truth.
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Figure 11: The Gini inequality of predicted number of fol-
lowers FLmodel versus that of empirical ground truth num-
ber of followers FLGT . In addition, the Gini of predicted
number of retweets RTmodel and predicted number of men-
tions MmodeL is compared with that of empirical number
of retweets RTGT and empirical number of mentions MGT .
Since number of re-tweets is related to posting activity, we
also report the inequality of posting activity during one week
interval tweetGT .
We can also use the attention diffusion model to predict
inequality of attention via retweets over time. We model the
number of retweets users receive is a function of the num-
ber of followers they have and their tweeting activity, and
then predict the number of retweets using regression. Specif-
ically, the number of retweets a user received, can be approx-
imately modeled as:
ri = af
b
i + cp
d
i (10)
We can then predict the number of retweets users get at
any time by using their predicted number of followers and
their observed tweeting activity at that time. As shown in
Figure 11, the Gini coefficient of the predicted number of
retweets rises over time; however, it is much less than the
ground truth value. The possible reason is that in Eq. 10, the
number of retweets is directly related to tweeting activity .
Since tweeting activity has much lower inequality, the in-
equality of number of predicted retweets is also lower than
the ground truth value.
Similar to above process, we model the number of men-
tions users received as a function of number of followers:
mi = ae
bfi (11)
With Eq. 11, we predict the number of mentions at three
different time points and report its Gini coefficient in Fig-
ure 11. The Gini coefficient of the predicted value, is very
close to the Gini coefficient of number of followers and
the ground truth. However, the marginal differences between
two different time points in the ground truth, are relatively
smaller than those in the prediction. This is due to in Eq. 11,
number of followers is the only dependant factor of number
of mentions.
In conclusion, the proposed model describes attention dif-
fusion among users in a network and can successfully pre-
dict the number of future followers each user will have and
the resulting attention inequality. However, it is unclear how
to use it to model the attention to messages being tweeted.
Besides, results in Figure 11 show that the attention user re-
ceived in terms of the number of retweets and the number of
mentions, may not simply be modeled by Eq. 10 and Eq. 11.
One of the future direction is to model attention diffusion in
terms of number of retweets and number of mentions with
both network and content information.
Related Works
Our work touches on topics from a variety of fields. We
briefly review some of the relevant literature.
Inequality
The study of economic inequality has a long history begin-
ning with the quantitative study of personal wealth distri-
bution by Vilfredo Pareto (Pareto 1896). In this work, the
empirical data analysis showed that the tail of wealth dis-
tribution follows a power-law. More recent analysis showed
that wealth inequality (in the U.S.) is not only large (Nor-
ton and Ariely 2011) but increasing with time (Piketty and
Saez 2014). A number of models (Champernowne 1953;
Scafetta, Picozzi, and West 2004; Silva and Yakovenko
2005) have been suggested to understand the features of em-
pirical wealth distributions and relate them to appropriate
mechanisms. For example, Banerjee and Yakovenko (Baner-
jee and Yakovenko 2010) adopted the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion model for the income distribution, which leads to an
approximated exponential for small and mid-range incomes,
and as a power-law for the highest incomes.
Inequality exists everywhere online (Wilkinson 2008). On
the World Wide Web, 80% of the browsing traffic goes to 5%
of the hostnames (McCurley 2007). The browsing distribu-
tion is also highly skewed among URLs, sites and domains.
Fortunato et al. (Fortunato, Flammini, and Menczer 2006)
suggests that search engines bias user traffic by their page
ranking strategies. They observed a high correlation between
click probability and hit rank. Therefore, the ranking pro-
cess has a potential to skew browsing attention to those top
ranked URLs.
Recently, with the advance of social networks, the stud-
ies of socio-economic inequalities have sparked a renewed
interests from researchers. Specifically, much research has
focused on a better understanding of the nature and origin of
inequalities from user behavior and network aspects. Among
them, Fuchs and Thurner (Fuchs and Thurner 2014) ana-
lyzed data from the virtual economy of the massive multi-
player online game, to find the explanations for origins of
wealth inequality in terms of behavior and network. Their
results suggested that wealthy players have high in- and out-
degree in the trade network; while in contrast, players that
are not socially well-connected are significantly poorer on
average. In addition to wealth inequality, Chatterjee (Chat-
terjee 2014) have also studied the city size inequality, firm
inequality, voting inequality, opinion inequality and their
origins from a statistical perspective. In this work, we aim
to study the attention inequalities in social media and to un-
derstand some possible reasons that lead to the inequalities.
In addition, we are also interested in understanding how in-
equalities changes over time.
Network Growth
Nodel et al. (Noel and Nyhan 2011) analyzed the “unfriend-
ing” behavior using longitudinal social network data. Their
results indicate that if there is a non-negligible friendship at-
trition over time, homophily in friendship retention induces
significant upward bias to peer influence. Kwak (Kwak,
Chun, and Moon 2011) studied the dynamics of unfollowing
in Twitter and showed that the reciprocity of the relation-
ships, the duration of a relationship, the followee’s informa-
tiveness, and the overlap of the relationships, affect the deci-
sion to unfollow. Myers and Leskovec (Myers and Leskovec
2014) studied the bursty dynamics of the Twitter Informa-
tion Network and found that the dynamics of network struc-
ture can be characterized by steady rates of change but with
interruption by sudden bursts. They also developed a model
that quantifies the dynamics of the network and predicts the
bursty of information diffusion events.
An array of models for describing the growth of social
networks have been described in literature. Random Walk
Model (Va´zquez 2003) was introduced to model the ran-
domized process of creating new links in a social network.
The BA Model (Barabasi and Albert 1999) uses the pref-
erential attachment mechanism (Va´zquez 2003) to gener-
ate the rich-get-richer phenomenon. The Nearest Neighbor
Model (Newman 2001) was proposed based on the obser-
vation that the probability of two unacquainted users to be-
come friends increases with the (weighted) number of com-
mon friends. Durr et al. (Durr, Protschky, and Linnhoff-
Popien 2012) proposed a new model based on homophily for
both P2P and centralized online social network. Their model
is able to explain the distribution and frequency of interac-
tions in online social networks. In our attention model, we
aim to characterize the attention diffusion and network dy-
namic mechanisms. In addition, we attempt for explanations
for inequalities and inequality dynamics from our attention
model.
Conclusion
We analyzed how people allocate their attention to other
users on a popular social media site Twitter by following
them, sharing (retweeting) the messages they post, and men-
tioning them in their own posts. We concluded that attention
is non-uniformly distributed, with a small number of users
dominating the attention received. This results in a high at-
tention inequality, much higher than even the widely dis-
cussed economic inequalities. Moreover, we showed that at-
tention inequality is increasing on Twitter.
To explain the rise of attention inequality, we studied how
the structure of the follower network changes due to at-
tention diffusion. We showed empirically that the attention
users receive by being mentioned or having their messages
retweeted leads to them gain new followers. The more at-
tention users have, the less likely they are to lose follow-
ers, resulting in a “rich get richer, poor get poorer” dynamic.
We constructed a phenomenological model of network dy-
namics based on these observations, and used the model to
predict the number of followers a user will have in the fu-
ture, and estimate future levels of attention inequality. In this
model, attention inequality grows in time.
Our work leaves many questions unanswered. What are
the benefits of inequality? Is it due to easier to deal with
information overload if users only have to pay attention to
popular items? What are the disadvantages of inequality? Is
it associated with less diversity in content and viewpoints
online? What motivates people to be engaged and contribute
to social media when they do not receive any attention? We
plan to address some of these questions in future work.
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